TRUMAN AND THE PENDERGAST MACHINE by Dorsett, Lyle W.
T R U M A N A N D THE 
P E N D E R G A S T M A C H I N E 
L Y L E W . D O R S E T T 
On a Monday in late January, 1945, Vice President Harry S. Truman 
flew to Kansas City from the nation's capital in an Army bomber. He had 
come to pay his final respects to his friend, Thomas Joseph Pendergast. 
Over one thousand people attended Pendergast's funeral. But perhaps no 
one there owed more to the one-time powerful boss than Harry Truman. On 
the other hand, there were few men to whom Pendergast owed more than 
Harry Truman. It is unlikely that Truman ever would have reached the 
United States Senate without the aid of boss Pendergast. Likewise it is cer -
tain that Pendergast1 s machine would never have reached the zenith of its 
strength without the support of Harry Truman. 
The relationship between Truman and the Pendergast machine has 
never been analyzed satisfactorily.1 Hopefully, this study will demonstrate 
the complexities of machine politics and the dependence of the machine upon 
its members. Likewise an attempt has been made to show that progressiv-
ism was not dead in Jackson County, Missouri, in the 1920Ts, and that a 
reformer and man of integrity could exist within the framework of a corrupt 
political machine. 
Throughout the teens and early twenties Tom Pendergast was building 
a powerful machine in Kansas City. During this same period he was trying 
to expand his power into rural Jackson County. 2 It was Harry Truman who 
would help make this a reality. 
In the early 1920Ts Tom Pendergast's brother, Michael, was in charge 
of the machine's county organization. Mike Pendergast was the county 
license inspector. With this foot in the door the machine was able to make 
some headway toward controlling county affairs by offering favors to select 
businessmen. However, no one could hope to build a strong political organ-
ization in Jackson County without dominating the county court. The court 
was an administrative rather than a judicial body, composed of two district 
judges and one presiding judge. A Jackson County newspaper editor 
summed up what control of the county court included. He who controls the 
court has "the big patronage which the court holds, the big road fund, about 
$6,000,000 a year and the revenue fund, about a million dollars a year from 
which salaries are paid, and the general management of some of the county 
offices. The purse strings of the county are therefore the prize. "3 
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Tom Pendergast had controlled the lucrative county court between 
1917 and 1920 but his judges, especially one Miles Bulger, were so blatantly 
corrupt that they were under constant attack from the local presses. In 
1920 tne boss lost control of the court. The Harding landslide no doubt par-
tially explains the machine's defeat in 1920. Pendergast, though, believed 
that its defeat was due in no small part to the shabby publicity that it had 
received for excessive spending and giving highly questionable contracts to 
favored construction f i rms . 4 
In the summer of 1922 Tom Pendergast re-thought his strategy 
regarding the county machine. The boss decided that the essential thing 
for him to have was the patronage from the county court. He needed a 
man who could win in rural Jackson County despite the antagonism that had 
grown up against the city boss and the inefficient, corrupt court which he 
had dominated through Miles Bulger. Desperately wanting to regain his 
hold on the rich county patronage, Tom Pendergast decided that he would 
be willing to relinquish if necessary such assets to his machine as special 
favors to contractors, in order to be able to hold on to the patronage. As 
subsequent events show, this is exactly what Pendergast was forced to do 
once he selected Harry Truman to become the machine's candidate for 
county judge. 
The Pendergast machine needed a good vote-getter to be able to win 
in rural Jackson County in 1922. Truman was selected to run for eastern 
district judge for several reasons. First of all, James M. Pendergast, 
Mike's son, was becoming very active in the organization. He had served 
in World War I with Truman, and he suggested him to his father as a possi-
bility. Not only did Jim Pendergast know and trust Truman, but the man 
from Independence, Missouri, had some important assets on his side. He 
was well known throughout the county because he had lived there since he 
was a small boy, had relatives scattered throughout the rural precincts and 
was a Baptist, a Legionnaire and a Mason. Likewise Truman was not 
tainted with being a city politician who was hoping to tell the country boys 
what was best for their district. 5 
The beginning of the Truman-Pendergast story was based on mutual 
need. Pendergast needed a county resident who could attract votes. And 
Truman, whose haberdashery partnership with Eddie Jacobson was failing, 
was in need of employment. 6 
Truman won the nomination in August, 1922, and then waltzed on to 
victory in November. The day that he was elected was an important turning 
point for Pendergast in Jackson County. Corruption would cease in the 
court with Truman's victory, but boss Tom's organization would dominate 
the county administration until his machine collapsed in 1939. Truman did 
lose when he ran for re-election in 1924, but that was due to a tactical 
error on the part of the Pendergast machine. Joseph Shannon, a Demo-
cratic factional leader who had thrown his support to Truman in 1922, was 
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given almost no county patronage. 7 Thus Shannon refused to support Tru-
man in 1924, and it cost the Democrats just enough votes to cause Truman 
to fall victim to his Republican opponent. At some other election the Pen-
dergast organization could have won without the Shannon organization's 
votes, but the Coolidge landslide brought so many votes to the Republican 
candidates that the Democrats needed every vote they could muster. 8 
Truman ran again in 1926, this time for presiding judge. He won and 
was destined to keep the Pendergast organization in power until he left 
Jackson County for the United States Senate in 1935. Truman became such 
an important cog in the machine that when Mike Pendergast died in 1929, 
the presiding judge was tapped to take over the leadership of the county arm 
of the organization. 9 Truman refused to bestow special favors upon the 
contractors who were friends of the machine and had been given special 
treatment by Miles Bulger. No company received a contract to do county 
work unless it was the lowest bidder. This included the new company which 
Pendergast had recently started — the Ready-Mixed Concrete Company. In 
1928, for example, when Truman was successful in getting a $6, 500, 000 
road building program adopted by the voters, 225 miles of road were paved 
and Ready-Mixed Concrete Company succeeded in paving only three-fourths 
of one mile out of the total project . 1 0 
Truman would not deal in graft. Nevertheless, he was successful in 
managing the Pendergast machine in rural Jackson County because he was 
an astute organizer who used the patronage to the organization's advan-
tage. H Moreover, Truman managed the cpurt so efficiently, and accom-
plished so much while in office, that he won an enormous following. The 
Kansas City Star, for example, never supported Pendergast candidates, and 
neither did the Examiner, which was published in Independence. Both of 
these papers, however, praised Truman1 s record and threw their editorial 
support to him each time that he ran for re-election. 
Truman's political career on the county court accentuates the com-
plexities of machine politics. The general assumption that bosses and 
reformers were at loggerheads does not apply to the Pendergast machine. 
Truman was an important part of a machine which dealt in the rankest sort 
of graft and corruption on occasions.1 2 But the future president of the 
United States was actually an honest reformer, reminiscent of some of the 
pre-war progressive traditions. Truman was committed to honest and effi-
cient management of government. He successfully worked toward cleaning 
up the graft in the county government and increasing the court's efficiency. 
At the same time he was able to survive as a key member in the machine. 
Judge Truman's work with Walter Matscheck demonstrates this phe-
nomenon. Matscheck, a Richard T. Ely student from the University of Wis-
consin, was a leading and respected reformer. He went to Kansas City to 
organize and head the Civic Research Institute. Matscheck's organization 
was financed by a number of civic leaders who were dedicated to the belief 
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that "democratic government can be efficient. " The Civic Research Insti-
tute studied local government and made suggestions for improvement. The 
Institute brought reforms to fruition in the 1920's that progressives had 
been seeking for years. 13 Matscheck loathed Tom Pendergast and most of 
the important members of the machine. But for Harry S. Truman, he had 
nothing but praise. Matscheck considered Truman a reformer who greatly 
improved county government. For example, the head of the Institute worked 
side-by-side with Truman to reorganize the county court. They developed 
a plan which gave Jackson County a model government. Their plan erased 
awkward bureaucracy and made the government much more efficient. 14 
The county judge worked hard to build an efficient county government 
that would be free of the corruption and waste of the Bulger days. Indeed, 
in his typical blunt and straightforward manner, Truman volunteered to 
have his court investigated by a grand jury. He offered to appear before a 
grand jury himself, and he said, "I am inviting the closest investigation, 
because I am proud of the record of the County Court. " I 5 
By leaving Truman alone to manage the county administration as he 
saw fit, Pendergast lost the graft which he had bestowed upon some of his 
associates during the Bulger regime. I 6 On the other hand, by letting Tru-
man have things his own way, the Pendergast machine controlled the patron-
age of the county court because Truman's excellent reputation allowed the 
machine to remain in power. Truman did give the machine charge of the 
court's patronage. He saw nothing wrong with that because he believed that 
the victors deserved such spoils. 1 ' 
Rewarding loyal party workers with patronage was one of the rules of 
the game in Truman's eyes. When he went to the United States Senate he 
gave immeasurable assistance to the machine which sent him there. The 
patronage which Truman funneled through the organization helped Tom Pen-
dergast expand his power beyond Kansas City and Jackson County into the 
entire state of Missouri. But Truman realized that he was deeply indebted 
to Pendergast. Without the machine's support in 1934, he would not have 
won the senatorial nomination. 
Truman was not Pendergast's first choice for the senate in 1934. The 
Kansas City boss offered his support to Joe Shannon, the factional leader 
who had blocked Truman's victory in 1924. (Since that time, Shannon had 
buried the hatchet and worked as a loyal member of the Pendergast organ-
ization. ) Shannon declined, though, because of ill health and old age. I 8 
The chairman of the Democratic State Committee, James Aylward, Pender-
gast 's right-hand man and ablest organizer, was promised the machine's 
backing but he refused it because he had no interest in running for office. 19 
After Aylward refused the offer, he and Jim Pendergast called on Harry 
Truman, asked him to run and he accepted. 2 0 
The only scholarly study of Truman's nomination and election in 1934 
was done by a historian who argues that Shannon and Aylward turned down 
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Pendergast's support because they hesitated to run for office with the 
stigma of Pendergast attached to their candidacy. Professor Eugene 
Schmidtlein maintains that Truman had to overcome this stigma to win the 
election.2 1 The evidence suggests several reasons why this thesis needs 
revision. First of all Shannon had not hesitated to run with Pendergast's 
backing before. Second, the Missouri Democrat, May 11, 1934, reported 
that Aylward refused to run simply because he had no desire to be a sena-
tor. This is reasonable inasmuch as Aylward had many opportunities to run 
for public office prior to 1934 and had never once demonstrated any desire 
to do so. Never in his long political career did he seek public office. Like-
wise if Pendergast support was more of a liability than an asset by 1934, it 
would be impossible to explain sagacious Lloyd StarkTs determined effort to 
win his backing for the gubernatorial nomination in 1936. Stark, the politi-
cally active apple grower from Louisiana, Missouri, worked throughout 
1935 for Pendergast's support. He wrote to United States Representative 
Clarence Cannon in 1935 and said that he would not seek support in St. Louis 
because "half of them [in St. Louis] will follow Kansas City anyway and sev-
eral of the boys tell me they will all follow if we get the Kansas City sup-
port. n 2 2 Stark also wrote to Tom Pendergast, asked for his support and 
commented that "thousands of Democrats in rural Missouri are looking to 
the Kansas City organization for . . . leadership . . . . I firmly believe with 
the announcement that the Kansas City organization has decided to support 
my candidacy, there will be no serious opposition."^ stark won Pender-
gast's support and became governor of Missouri. 
Pendergast's support was no more of a handicap for Truman than it 
was for Stark. As a matter of fact, Truman almost certainly would have 
lost the primary if it had not been for Tom Pendergast. It was a four-
cornered race with Truman running against Jacob L. "Tuck" Milligan (who 
was backed by Senator Bennett Clark from St. Louis), Congressman John 
Cochran and an unknown named Cleveland. The precise events that took 
place after Truman agreed to run are shrouded in obscurity, but when the 
various shreds of evidence are placed together it appears that Pendergast 
made one of the shrewdest moves of his political career in his determined 
effort to win the senatorial race. A political observer in St. Louis sug-
gested that Pendergast had a trick up his sleeve, writing that "Pendergast 
never did hunt ducks with a brass band. It has always been hard to tell what 
he is doing, but easy to tell what he has done the day after the election. " 2 4 
The St. Louis politician who wrote this letter, G. H. Foree, wrote a series 
of letters in which he reported what he was discovering about the senatorial 
race. This man was a perceptive observer because he quite accurately 
predicted that Senator Bennett Clark's candidate, Tuck Milligan, would 
lose. Foree also said that Clark would then realize that he could not stand 
up against Pendergast's powerful organization, and consequently, after the 
1934 primary, Clark would jump on the Pendergast bandwagon and do what 
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Truman and the boss wanted in order to obtain the machine's support for 
his own re-election in 1938.25 
Foree maintained that if Truman could get the Igoe-Dickmann faction 
in St. Louis to support him he would defeat Milligan. When Congressman 
John Cochran of St. Louis entered the race against Milligan and Truman, 
Foree argued that he was placed there to take votes away from Milligan in 
the St. Louis area. He said that a dummy candidate was put in the congres-
sional primary in place of Cochran, and that as soon as the primary was 
over, that person would withdraw and Cochran would run and succeed him-
self for congress in the general election. This plan was arranged, according 
to Foree's account, when Joe Shannon went to St. Louis and had a con-
ference with Bill Igoe and John Cochran, and later when Igoe went to Kan-
sas City for a second meeting. Cochran himself went to Kansas City and 
called on Pender gast, and immediately after the series of conferences 
Cochran entered the senatorial r ace . 2 ^ 
This is not an implausible analysis when several other factors are 
added. First of all, in other campaigns Pendergast had been working 
closely with the Igoe-Dickmann faction in St. Louis. 7 It is significant too 
that Pendergast supported Cochran in 1932 for the congressional nomina-
tion. 28 Cochran was a member of the Igoe organization. Indeed, he had 
been IgoeTs secretary when the St. Louis factional leader was a member of 
the United States House of Representatives.2^ It is interesting as well that 
somewhat prematurely the Pendergast organ, the Missouri Democrat, 
announced that if Truman decided to enter the race he would have the Igoe-
Dickmann faction's support, 30 suggesting that some kind of agreement had 
already been consummated between the St. Louis men and Pendergast. And 
even more fascinating is the fact that just as Foree predicted, Cochran lost 
in the primary but stepped in to succeed himself in the congressional race 
that November, a n d w o n . ^ 
It seems safe to assume that there was an agreement between the 
Pendergast and Igoe crowds. Politics often makes strange bedfellows but 
this relationship is perfectly understandable. Both Pendergast and Igoe had 
an interest in seeing Bennett Clark's power curbed. Therefore it is not at 
all unnatural that they would work out a plan together. Igoe's faction could 
merely have supported Truman over Milligan but it was much wiser to 
place another man in the race who was from St. Louis. In this way Coch-
ran, a popular congressman, would have a much greater chance of cutting 
into Clark's area of strongest support than would a Kansas City man who 
was not as well known in the eastern part of the state. 
In any case the Pendergast machine swung into action with all that it 
could deliver for Truman. For well over a month at least, the organization 
did not put on a Truman drive in St. Louis. The Cochran headquarters, on 
the other hand, was booming in the big city. ^2 In the outstate areas it was 
a different matter for the county judge. Robert Holloway, the secretary of 
TRUMAN AND MISSOURI POLITICS. ABOVE: Harry S. Truman, the 1934 
Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate seat for Missouri, greets Con-
gressman John J . Cochran at a St. Louis campaign rally. Cochran, who 
was from St. Louis * was one of Truman's three opponents for the nomina-
tion. Professor Dor sett feels that Cochran entered the race at the request 
of Pendergast to draw votes away from Jacob L. "Tuck" Milligan, Truman's 
major opponent (see page 21); Professor Schmidtlein argues that Cochran 
was sincerely trying to get the nomination for himself and ran a very strong 
race (see pages 32-33). (Photo courtesy of the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. ) 
UPPER RIGHT: Judge Harry S. Truman, Presiding Judge of the County 
Court, Jackson County, Missouri. (Photo taken September 24, 1927.) 
LOWER RIGHT: "Boss Tom" Pendergast. Matt Goree, city editor, and John 
Doohan, librarian, of the Kansas City Star have identified the pictures on 
Pendergast 's desk. On the back row, left to right, a re a religious picture; 
the wedding photo of Pendergast 's daughter, Marceline, and William E. 
Burnett, J r . ; and a photo of another daughter, Aileen Pendergast. In front, 
left to right, are a photo of James Pendergast, a brother, and a religious 
picture. (Photo courtesy of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the State His-
torical Society of Missouri. ) 
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of the Missouri Public Service Commission, was granted a leave of absence 
to take charge of Truman's outstate headquarters in Jefferson City. 3 3 The 
evidence indicates that in some areas of the state at least, Governor Guy B. 
Park, who owed his nomination and election to Pendergast, 3 4 had state 
employees working diligently for Truman. One employee of the state wrote 
to the governor that "the Grain Department and Police Department are 
thoroughly organized and there are few who have not fallen in line. . . . 
All of we heads of departments are strong for and working daily for Mr. 
Truman."35 
Pendergast aided Truman in yet another way. He provided Demo-
cratic State Chairman Jim Aylward to direct the future senator's cam-
paign.*^ This was a major asset because Aylward had connections all over 
the state. Harry Truman, however, had some assets of his own which 
surely provided him with additional support. His excellent record as county 
judge certainly helped, and no doubt made it easier for such respected indi-
viduals as William T. Kemper, J r . , the son of a prominent Kansas City 
banker, to promote a "Young People's Truman-for-Senator Club."3 7 The 
candidate's early life helped too. For example, a rural Missouri newspa-
per, The St. Clair County Democrat, threw its editorial support behind 
Truman because he, "unlike the other candidates seeking office, was born 
on a farm. He was reared between the plow handles . . . . " 3 ° 
Truman's own assets, plus the well organized support from the exten-
sive Pendergast machine, enabled him to win by slightly more than forty 
thousand votes over Cochran who placed second. Milligan ran a poorer 
third and Cleveland was never even in the race. Milligan might have done 
considerably better in a race against Truman alone because Cochran car-
ried the city and county of St. Louis by enormous majori t ies . 3 9 The Igoe 
machine could have delivered a portion of the St. Louis vote to Truman, but 
Congressman Cochran was a popular man who drew support to himself 
despite Senator Clark's active campaign for Milligan. 
Truman did not forget his debt to Pendergast. After he entered the 
United States Senate he continued to adhere to his belief that the patronage 
belonged to those who toiled in the political vineyard. When the question of 
who was going to direct Missouri's federal work relief arose, Matthew S. 
Murray, a loyal member of the Pendergast machine, was recommended by 
Senator Truman. Senator Clark went along with the recommendation 
because, as one friendly attorney suggested: "He was quite independent 
when he first went into office. Now he realizes, of course, that he must go 
along with Pendergast or be defeated for the nomination. " 4^ 
Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's WPA administrator, granted the senators' 
wishes. Murray was appointed Director of Federal Public Works in Mis-
souri .^ 1 Consequently, Pendergast's labors to elevate Truman to the Sen-
ate paid rich dividends. It was abundantly clear that the machine absolutely 
controlled the relief program. When one citizen wrote to Governor Park 
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and asked for assistance in securing employment with the WPA, he replied 
that she must go through Matthew Murray.4 2 Truman also refused to help 
people find federal relief employment without first going through the ma-
chine. When one Kansas City man sought the senator's support, Truman 
replied, "If you will send us endorsements from the Kansas City Democratic 
Organization, I shall be glad to do what I can for you." 4 3 
Pendergast's control of federal work relief in Missouri was a t r e -
mendous boon to his machine. Thanks to Truman's loyalty, the boss was 
able to use federal patronage as a strong lever to strengthen his hold on the 
entire state. It enabled Tom Pendergast to become the most powerful man 
in Missouri . 4 4 
From the first days of their political association in 1922, down to the 
collapse of the Pendergast machine in 1939, Pendergast and Truman had 
benefited each other. Harry Truman would never have reached national 
prominence without the boss 's support, and likewise Tom Pendergast could 
not have strengthened his hold on Jackson County and the state of Missouri 
without Truman's loyal assistance. That day in January, 1945, when the 
Vice President went to pay final tribute to the dead boss, symbolizes in a 
kind of intangible way how the two politicos had always provided mutual aid. 
Truman's appearance at the funeral added some dignity to the boss 's t a r -
nished reputation. Likewise, despite the criticism he received for attend-
ing Pendergast's funeral, Harry Truman added a few inches to his stature 
in the minds of those who admired his loyalty and courage.4 5 
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